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Abstract: This study considers a fresh produce supply chain consisting of  one supplier and multiple retailers 
with a quantity discount contract in two scenarios—independent procurement and joint procurement. The 
supplier’s optimal pricing decision and the retailers’ optimal procurement decisions under the quantity discount 
contract are investigated. Furthermore, the impact of  the deterioration rate on the profit of  supply chains is 
examined. The results show that joint procurement is more profitable than independent procurement and 
guarantees a win-win outcome. More importantly, retailers will be motivated to form a grand coalition when the 
total profit can be rationally allocated among them. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013, the Chinese government proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to boost regional 
cooperation and called for the establishment of a new regional cooperation model. The BRI aims to 
start a new era of economic growth along the breadth and length of Asia, Europe and Africa (Liu 
et al., 2018). This strategy connects China with its neighbors in Asia and more than 60 other 
countries. The BRI has brought a great deal of business opportunities to the countries along the 
BRI corridors, creating a strategic position in the globalization. 
The countries linked through the BRI hold abundant fresh produce resources, and China has 
an enormous market demand for these products. Therefore, the supply-demand relationship of 
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fresh produce can promote cooperation between these countries and advance the implementation 
of mutually beneficial international policies, which will bring new opportunities for the fresh 
produce supply chain (FPSC). The countries joining the BRI have accelerated the construction of 
transport infrastructures to improve the efficiency of the FPSC. For instance, tropical fruits can be 
transported along the BRI from Southeast Asia to China by China Cargo Airlines or China Railway 
Express. 
In the BRI context, fresh produce is transported from Southeast Asia to China. In FPSC 
management, one of the greatest challenges is to maintain product freshness. In reality, to reduce 
losses caused by deterioration, retailers may cooperatively procure fresh produce to improve their 
own profits. For example, Malaysia, one country along the BRI, supplies tropical fruits to many 
different supermarkets in China, and most of these retailers have joined together to procure 
products to receive a lower selling price from the supplier. This collective action on the part of 
these retailers constitutes a joint procurement strategy, in which the retailers have formed a grand 
coalition and obtained a quantity discount contract.  
However, the question is whether this joint procurement strategy is better than independent 
procurement under the BRI. Different from Nie et al. (2015), by mainly focusing on joint 
procurement to coordinate the supply chain, our research not only studies joint procurement 
among retailers but also considers the impact of the deterioration rate on FPSC operations. 
Generally, in this paper, we investigate the following two procurement strategies: (1) one strategy 
in which each retailer procures fresh produce from a supplier individually and (2) another in 
which retailers form a grand coalition to place an aggregated order with a supplier, which may 
involve a coordination cost. The objective is to maximize the total profits in an FPSC by 
considering two unique variables of an FPSC, quantity discounts and deterioration rates. 
The study focuses on a two-echelon FPSC consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers. By 
applying game theory, we develop mathematical models under independent procurement and 
joint procurement. To maximize profit, there are two variables to determine: the supplier’s selling 
price and the ordering cycle for both the supplier and the retailers. We also investigate how FPSC 
coordination and a win-win outcome can be achieved between the supplier and the retailers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related 
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literature and position our work before describing the model and assumptions in Section 3. In 
Section 4, we study the quantity discount and coordination of the FPSC under the independent 
procurement strategy. In Section 5, we present our investigation of the quantity discount in the 
FPSC under the joint procurement strategy. In Section 6, we present an extended model under 
joint procurement and consider the coordination costs. In Section 7, we use numerical examples to 
illustrate the model before drawing our conclusions in Section 8. 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we review the literature spanning four streams based on our modeling 
approach. First, we discuss supply chain management under the BRI. Second, we discuss FPSC 
issues in operations management. This review primarily covers recent analytical work addressing 
various issues related to inventory management, pricing, and ordering strategies. Third, we 
discuss the work related to contracting coordination in the supply chain stream. Fourth, we 
discuss different supply chain structures as applied to operations management. 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend to research supply chain management under 
the BRI. Liu et al. (2018) explored the impacts of cost-sharing contract on the key decisions for a 
logistics service supply chain with mass customization. Zeng et al. (2018) proposed a modified 
gravity prediction model to calculate the changes in shipping networks under the BRI. Sheu and 
Kundu (2018) developed a multi-methodological approach to address the dynamic challenges of 
international logistic network reconfiguration caused by the BRI. Jiang et al. (2018) discussed an 
integrated fresh produce scheduling problem that combined harvest and distribution 
simultaneously to reduce processing time and quality decay. It appears most of the previous 
research focused on the logistics service and transportation network. There has been no 
consideration for the contracting coordination with joint procurement of FPSC under the BRI. 
In the past two decades, there have been a large number of quantitative studies on FPSCs. 
These studies have mainly focused on inventory management, pricing, and ordering strategies. 
Wang and Li (2012) argued that although predicting the quality of perishable products is difficult, 
it is possible to develop a pricing method to maximize profit based on more accurate information 
about product quality. Tat et al. (2015) developed an economic order quantity model for 
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non-instantaneous deteriorating items with and without shortages to investigate the performance 
of a vendor-managed inventory system. Hou et al. (2017) introduced an ordering strategy for fresh 
produce with back storage at a wholesale market. Some studies have considered the three factors 
in combination. For instance, Herbon et al. (2014) examined a replenishment policy in regular time 
for perishable products and developed a dynamic pricing strategy to attract more consumers and 
generate greater profit. Chen et al. (2014) analyzed the issue of joint pricing and inventory control 
for perishable products with fixed lifetimes over a finite horizon. Li et al. (2015) considered 
strategies of inventory control and joint dynamic pricing for perishable products in a stochastic 
inventory system. Sainathan (2013) focused on perishable products with two-period shelf lives in 
an infinite horizon and derived optimal pricing decisions and ordering strategies. However, none 
of these studies has considered the ways in which FPSCs can be coordinated with a contract. 
The application of contracts for supply chain coordination has attracted attention from 
practitioners and scholars. Contract management and coordination are crucial in FPSCs. 
Importantly, supply chain members usually have different coordination strategies, and contracts 
are an alternative strategy to coordinate supply chains. Cai et al. (2013) designed an incentive 
scheme to coordinate an FPSC with one supplier and one retailer; this scheme examined whether 
an incentive contract could remove the double marginalization that exists in supply chains and 
encourage partners to act in a coordinated manner. Duan et al. (2010) investigated a ”one vendor 
and one buyer“ supply chain for perishable products; they proposed a model to analyze the 
benefits of coordinating supply chains using a quantity discount strategy and how to achieve an 
optimized win-win outcome. Zhang et al. (2015) developed a cooperative investment and 
revenue-sharing contract to coordinate all parties involved in an FPSC; all players jointly invested 
in technology to reduce deterioration. Wang and Chen (2017) studied an FPSC consisting of a 
supplier and a retailer, they examined the option pricing strategy in the newsvendor framework 
with wholesale price and call option portfolio contracts. In addition, some authors have used 
different approaches to coordinate inventory systems (Taleizadeh & Noori-daryan, 2015; 
Taleizadeh et al., 2016; Taleizadeh et al., 2014; Taleizadeh et al., 2015). The above papers mainly 
focused on the coordination mechanisms in an FPSC with one supplier and one retailer. They did 
not consider how to coordinate a supply chain with multiple retailers. 
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There is little research on coordinating an FPSC consisting of one supplier and multiple 
retailers or multiple retailers and one supplier through a contract. Zhang et al. (2012) analyzed 
how to coordinate a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers under 
demand disruptions. Cao et al. (2013) considered a supply chain with one supplier and multiple 
retailers that competed in quantity; they researched how production costs and demand disruptions 
impact a revenue-sharing contract. Chen (2012) explored a coordination mechanism and various 
procurement policies for a supply chain with multiple suppliers and one manufacturer in the 
electronics market. Mohebbi and Li (2015) developed a mathematical model for a coalition of 
multiple suppliers based on game theory and improved individual profit in the network. Lim et al. 
(2015) showed how to coordinate a supply chain with one retailer and multiple suppliers using 
consignment contracts when considering revenue sharing. Taleizadeh et al. (2016) introduced 
different composite coordinating strategies to enhance the coordination of supply chains, where 
each supply chain was composed of one manufacturer and a group of noncompeting retailers. Ye 
et al. (2016) conducted a systematic analysis of the efficiency of unilateral or bilateral horizontal 
competitive reverse supply chains with quality-dependent price-only contracts. Noori-daryan et al. 
(2017) analyzed the optimal pricing and replenishment decisions of a supply chain consisting of a 
single manufacturer and multiple retailers, where a composite contract combines quantity and 
freight discounts and a composite incentive contract is incorporated into the model. However, the 
models of these studies have not considered the characteristics of fresh produce and quantity 
discount contracts. 
To address the joint procurement issue, we develop a mathematical model of joint 
procurement for a coalition of retailers, and analytical results are obtained by comparing the cases 
of independent procurement and joint procurement. Akcay et al. (2010) used an algorithm of 
multinomial time to investigate the optimal joint dynamic pricing of multiple perishable products 
when considering strategic consumers. Gallego and Hu (2014) presented a joint pricing approach 
for competitive products in a special market environment with perishable products consisting of 
substitutable and complementary products to derive optimal pricing solutions. Taleizadeh et al. 
(2017) studied a joint pricing and alliance selection decision-making problem in a retailer-led 
supply chain. Our model, however, combines critical parameters involved in the joint procurement 
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of multiple retailers and one supplier with a quantity discount contract. 
Table 1 summarizes the literature and notes the differences compared to our research. The 
above review suggests that (1) the coordination of FPSCs with one supplier and multiple retailers 
has been minimally studied; (2) studies considering a joint procurement strategy for retailers are 
rare; and (3) the profit allocation of retailers under joint procurement in FPSCs is infrequently 
examined. The main difference between our paper and the above literature is that we focus on 
developing a quantity discount contract to coordinate an FPSC consisting of one supplier and 
multiple retailers. We do so by comparing two scenarios, independent procurement and joint 
procurement, to create a pricing strategy and to investigate the profit allocation among the 
retailers. 
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Table 1  Summary of the relevant literature 
Authors 
Decision policy Supply chain structure 
Deterioration Focus 
Pricing Ordering Inventory 1-1 1-N N-1 
Wang and Li (2012) √   √   √ Optimizing decisions 
Tat et al. (2015)   √ √   √ Optimizing decisions 
Hou et al. (2017)  √  √   √ Optimizing decisions 
Herbon et al. (2014) √      √ Optimizing decisions 
Chen et al. (2014) √  √    √ Optimizing decisions 
Sainathan (2013) √ √     √ Optimizing decisions 
Cai et al. (2013)    √    Contracting coordination (incentive contract) 
Duan et al. (2010)    √   √ Contracting coordination (quantity discount contract) 
Zhang et al. (2015)    √    Contracting coordination (revenue-sharing contract) 
Wang and Chen (2017) √   √    Contracting coordination (option contract) 
Zhang et al. (2012)     √   Contracting coordination (revenue-sharing contract) 
Cao et al. (2013)     √   Contracting coordination (revenue-sharing contract) 
Chen (2012)      √  Optimizing decisions 
Mohebbi and Li (2015)      √  Optimizing decisions 
Taleizadeh et al. (2016)      √  Optimizing decisions 
Lim et al. (2015)      √  Optimizing decisions 
Noori-daryan et al. (2017) √    √   Contracting coordination (composite incentive contract) 
Akcay et al. (2010) √      √ Optimizing decisions 
Gallego and Hu (2014) √      √ Optimizing decisions 
Taleizadeh et al. (2017) √   √    Optimizing decisions 
This paper √    √  √ 
Contracting coordination (quantity discount contract) & profit 
allocation 
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3. Problem description 
We consider a two-tier supply chain composed of one supplier and many 
retailers. In this chain, the retailers purchase fresh produce from the supplier. The 
retailers determine the ordering cycle. When they sign the quantity discount contract, 
the supplier requests that the retailers change their current order size and offers them 
compensation via a quantity discount at a low selling price. From the retailers’ 
perspective, they negotiate jointly, form a coalition to gain more profit and rationally 
allocate the total profit of their coalition. When the selling season begins, the retailers 
have no opportunity to replenish their inventory. Figure 1 demonstrates the research 
framework for multiple retailers in an FPSC. 
 
Figure 1  Research framework for multiple retailers in an FPSC 
In this paper, the supply chain consists of one supplier and n  different retailers. 
Let  = 1,2 ,N nL, , which is a set of retailers in the game, where n  is the number 
of retailers in the coalition. To simplify the mathematical model without losing 
generality, we assume the following: 
• The supplier acts as the leader, and the retailers are the followers. 
• The salvage value of unsold products at the end of the sale period is zero. 
• Demand is constant. 
• Stock-out is not allowed. 
 
Joint Procurement 
Independent Procurement   
Supplier 
.     
.    





Transportation Research Part E (2019) 
10 
 
• The supplier has the ability to provide fresh produce to the retailers 
immediately. 
We develop a mathematical model for an FPSC consisting of one supplier and 
multiple retailers under different conditions. According to Tavakoli and Taleizadeh 
(2017), the inventory level at time t  decreases due to demand and deterioration. 
Therefore, according to this description, the inventory changes with respect to time, 
I(t), are satisfied by the following equation: 
                      
( )




= − − , 0 it T                    
(1) 
This equation has a boundary condition of ( ) 0i iI T = , where I(t) is the inventory 
level of products at time t, iT  is the ordering cycle length of retailer i , iD  is the 
demand rate of retailer i per unit time, and   is the deterioration rate of fresh 
produce. For the first and second differential equations, the solution of Eq. (1) is as 
follows: 
                      
( )








= − , 0 it T  .                 
(2) 
The main objective of this study is to gain new insights into effective joint 
procurement management such that the total cost is minimized and the total profit is 
maximized simultaneously. Some notations and parameters are as follows: 
sK : the fixed ordering cost of the supplier; 
rK : the fixed ordering cost of the retailers; 
iD : the demand rate of retailer i per unit time; 
ih : the inventory holding cost per unit; 
I(t): the inventory level of products at time t; 
 : the deterioration rate of fresh produce; 
p : the selling price that the retailers charge consumers per unit; 
c  : the supplier’s production cost per unit; 
iQ : the ordering quantity of retailer i; 
( )ix  : the profit allocation to retailer i; 
s : the profit of the supplier; 
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r i : the profit of retailer i; 
 : the selling price that the supplier charges the retailers per unit; and 
iT : the ordering cycle 
4. Coordination of the FPSC under independent procurement 
In this section, we examine the coordination of an FPSC with and without a 
quantity discount contract under independent procurement. 
4.1. Scenario I: without a quantity discount contract 
When the supplier and each retailer act as individuals in an FPSC without a 
quantity discount contract, they try to maximize their own profit and ignore the 
interests of others. 
In this situation, the ordering quantity of retailer i  is set to equal an initial 
inventory level of fresh produce (Taleizadeh et al., 2013), ( ) (0)wi Di iQ T I= . Let 
superscript w  and subscript D  denote the case without a quantity discount under 
independent procurement. Thus, the retailer’s ordering quantity, denoted by 
( )wi DiQ T , is as follows: 
                      









                        
(3) 
The total cost for retailer i  is composed of three parts: (1) the ordering cost, 
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Hence, the profit ( )w wDri DiT  
of retailer i  per unit of time is as follows: 






w w w wDir
Dri Di Di i i i i Di iw w w
Di Di Di
e TK e






= − − −
         
(4) 
The truncated Taylor series is used as a good approximation (Taleizadeh et al., 
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2013). Utilizing the truncated Taylor series expansion for the exponential term 
211 ( )
2
Te T T  = + +                           (5) 
the profit
 
of retailer i  per unit of time in Eq. (4) can be simplified as follows:  
        
( ) ( ) ( ),
2
w
w w w w wDir
Dri Di Di i Di i i Di iw
Di
TK
T p D h D
T
    = − − − + .
         
(6) 
We take the supplier’s selling price for retailer 
w
Di  as a benchmark for an FPSC 
without a contract. In the following sections, we set 
w
Di  as a parameter for the 
optimal supplier’s selling price for retailers with a quantity discount contract. Now, 
consider the situation involving the coordination of the FPSC without a contract 
under independent procurement. For a given 
w
Di , taking the first derivative of Eq. 
(6) with respect to the ordering cycle wDiT , we set it equal to 0; therefore,
 
2
( , ) ( )
= 0
( ) 2
w w w w
Dri Di Di i Di ir
w w
Di Di
d T h DK
dT T
   +
− = . Taking the second derivative of Eq. (6) 
with respect to wDiT , we have 
2
2 3
( , ) 2
= 0
( ) ( )
w w w






−  , which proves that the 
retailer’s profit function ( , )w wDri Di DiT   is concave to 
w
DiT . Therefore, we find that the 
optimal ordering cycle is as follows: 
















into Eq. (6), we obtain the retailer’s optimal profit in the 
decentralized FPSC as follows: 
           
( ) ( ) ( ), 2w w w w wDri Di Di i Di i r i Di iT p D K h D     = − − +  .         (8) 
Therefore, the supplier’s optimal profit is: 















= − − 
 
 .                      (9) 
In the following section, we determine whether an FPSC can be coordinated by a 
quantity discount contract under independent procurement. 
4.2. Scenario II: with a quantity discount contract 
This section addresses FPSC coordination with a quantity discount contract. We 
are interested in whether the FPSC can be coordinated in this scenario and under 
what conditions. The supplier’s objective is to increase profit by enticing the retailers 
to order more fresh produce. Under the quantity discount strategy, the supplier 
requests that the retailers change their current order size and offers them 
compensation via a quantity discount at a low selling price, cwDi . Let superscript 
cw  and subscript D  denote the case of a quantity discount under independent 
procurement. 
In this paper, we assume that the supplier is the supply chain leader and that the 
objective is to maximize the supplier’s profit. Based on the above discussion 
regarding system operation, the problem can be modeled in terms of two decision 
variables, ( , )
cw cw
Di DiT . Therefore, the optimization problem of FPSC coordination 
under a quantity discount contract can be formulated as follows: 
1
( , ) ( )
n
cw cw cw cw s
Ds Di Di Di i cw
i Di
K




= − −                  (10) 
. . ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
2
cw
cw cw cw cw cw w w wDir
Dri Di Di i Di i i Di i Dri Di Dicw
Di
TK
s t T p D h D T
T
       = − − − +   (11) 
Eq. (11) indicates that the retailers accept the contract only if their individual 
profit is no less than that in the case without a quantity discount contract (Scenario I). 
Here, cwDi  is an endogenous variable, while 
w
Di  is an exogenously given variable. 
By solving the constraint condition, we have the supplier’s optimal selling price 
that it charges the retailers: 
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= + − − +         .      
(12) 
Eq. (12) shows that the supplier’s selling price cwDi  under the quantity discount 
contract has a certain relationship with the selling price 
w
Di  without the contract. 
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Taking the first derivative of Eq. (13) with respect to the ordering cycle cwDiT , we 
obtain the following equation: 
        
2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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= , we obtain the ordering cycle as follows: 
2 2( ) ( ) 4 ( )
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+ + + + +
. 
Taking the second derivative of Eq. (13) with respect to ordering cycle cwDiT , we 
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(15) 













 , which has a maximum value occurring at 





= . Therefore, cwDiT
  is the optimal ordering cycle. 
Proposition 1. For the independent procurement case, when the supplier’s selling 
price cw

















min Di max  
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= − + 
 
 
  , the quantity discount 
contract ( , )cw cwDi DiT
  can facilitate FPSC coordination.  
Proposition 1 indicates that when the supplier’s selling price is in the range of 
[ , ]cw cwmin max 
  , the profits for the supplier and the retailers are increased. Therefore, the 
supplier can obtain a higher profit from the quantity discount contract when the 
FPSC coordination is achieved. 
However, according to Zheng et al. (2017), a decentralized system is unlikely to 
achieve an optimized result that benefits the whole supply chain. Therefore, the 
search for a new mechanism that can maximize total profit in an FPSC while also 
increasing individual profit is warranted. This idea is discussed in the next section. 
5. Coordination of the FPSC under joint procurement 
In this section, the retailers negotiate jointly. The purpose of the retailers’ 
adoption of a joint procurement policy is to lower the supplier’s selling price, which 
will lead to more profit. From the supplier’s perspective, joint procurement will 
potentially increase the ordering quantity, which, in turn, will increase the supplier’s 
profit. Here, n refers to the total number of retailers; m is the number of retailers who 
form the joint procurement coalition; and j is the number of retailers who do not join 
the coalition, where j n m= − . 
5.1. Scenario I: without a quantity discount contract 
Let superscript w  and subscript C  denote the case without a quantity 
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discount under joint procurement. The ordering cycle wCT  is determined by retailer 
coalition M . Therefore, the profit ( , )w w wCr Ci CT   
of retailer coalition M  per unit of 







C CT Twm m m
w w w wCr
Cr Ci C i i i i Ci iw w w
i i iC C C
e TK e




 = = =
− − −
= − − −   .
    
(16) 
Applying the same concept as in Eq. (5), Eq. (16) can be simplified as follows:  
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( )
2
wm m
w w w w wCr
Cr Ci C i Ci i i Ci iw
i iC
TK
T p D h D
T
    
= =
= − − − +  .
          
(17) 
For any given 
w
C i , taking the first derivative of Eq. (17) with respect to 
w
CT , we 
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= ( ) 0
( ) 2
w w w m
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− + = . Taking the 
second derivative of Eq. (17) with respect to 
w
CT , we have 
2
2 3
( , ) 2
= 0
( ) ( )
w w w






−  , which means that the retailer’s profit function 
( , )w w wCr Ci CT  , is concave to 
w





















into Eq. (17), we obtain the optimal 
profit of retailer coalition M  in the centralized FPSC as follows: 
       1 1
( , ) ( ) 2 ( )
m m
w w w w w
Cr Ci C i Ci i r i Ci i
i i
T p D K h D    
= =
= − − + 
 .          
(18) 
Now, a new question is raised. What conditions would entice the retailers to join 
or remain in the coalition given the total profit, as shown in Eq. (18)? To analyze this 
matter, we introduce a concave game, also called a cooperation game. A concave 
game is a totally balanced strategy among players that can be expressed by its 
concave profit function ( )v  . Consequently, the game and every subgame have a 
nonempty core. According to Dror et al. (2012), a concave game implies joint 
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procurement. In our case, it means that each retailer in the coalition shall be allocated 
a proportion of the total profit. Specifically, the amount of profit allocated to each 
retailer must be larger than that when each retailer operates individually; it is only in 
this case that there will be an incentive for them to form a coalition. 
To verify whether ( ), ( )wCrN M  is a concave game of the multiple retailers, we 
set subset R as the number of retailers forming the coalition, where 
 M R N j  − , and obtain the following lemma: 
Lemma 1. ( ), ( )wCrN M  is a concave game. 
Lemma 1 indicates that joint procurement is a concave game. To determine how 
the profit can be rationally allocated, let ix  be the profit of retailer i . The retailers 
will cooperate if ix  satisfies the following conditions: (1) efficiency—all profits are 









= ; and (2) stability—all the retailers have enough 
motivation to stay in the coalition only if 
cw
i Drix  (Dror et al., 2012). Note that 

























, and the profit of the fresh produce supplier is 
1
( , ) ( )
m
w w w w s








= − − . Comparing the profit of each retailer under joint 
procurement to the retailers’ profit under independent procurement, we obtain 
1
2
2 ( ) ( )
( )
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x K h D h
h D
    
 
=
− = + − +
+
. We know that 























i Drix −  . 
Based on the above, the profit of a coalition of retailers can be rationally 
allocated. Therefore, joint procurement among retailers makes sense. 
Proposition 2. A coalition is better than individual operations for both the supplier 
and the retailers. 
Compared to the independent procurement of retailers, joint procurement can 
improve the profit of both the retailers and the supplier, motivating coalition 
formation. Based on Proposition 2, we know that retailers can join together to form a 
coalition and procure fresh produce at a discounted price. However, it is unknown 
whether the supplier and the retailers will gain more profit if they sign a quantity 
discount contract. In the following section, we investigate the expected profit of each 
player under a quantity discount contract and analyze whether a win-win situation 
can result. 
5.2. Scenario II: with a quantity discount contract 
In actual operations, the quantity discount policy is used extensively to regulate 
the relationship among retailers and to achieve FPSC coordination. It is natural to 
inquire about what procurement decisions will be made if the quantity discount 
contract is implemented. If the profit of each retailer under joint procurement is 
greater than the retailers’ profit under independent procurement, then they will 
accept the contract. Therefore, the optimization problem of FPSC coordination under 
a quantity discount contract can be formulated as Eq. (19) and Eq. (20). Here, let 
superscript cw and subscript C denote the case with a quantity discount under joint 
procurement. 




cw cw cw cw s







= − −                (19) 
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s.t.  ( ) ( ), ,cw cw cw w w wCr C C Cr Ci CT T                      (20) 
Solving the constraint condition, we have the selling price that the supplier 
charges the retailer as follows: 
1 1 1 1
( ) 1
2 2 2
w cw cwn n n n
cw w wC i i C Cr r
C Ci i i Ci i iw cw
i i i iC C
T h DT TK K
D h D D
T T

   


= = = =
   
= + + + − − +   
  
     (21) 
Substituting cwC  into ( , )
cw cw cw
Cs C CT  , we obtain the optimal profit of the 
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    (22) 
Taking the first derivative of Eq. (22) with respect to ordering cycle cwCT , we 
obtain the following equation: 
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= , we obtain the following ordering cycle:  
2 2( ) ( ) 4 ( )
=
2
s r s r s rcw
C





+ + + + +
.  
Taking the second derivative of Eq. (22) with respect to ordering cycle 
cw
CT , we 
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= − + + + + 
 
 
− + + + + 
   .  
(24) 
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from Eq. (24) has a maximum value 
occurring at cw cwC CT T
= . 
Proposition 3. For the joint procurement case with one supplier and multiple 
retailers, when the supplier’s selling price cw


















where cw cw cwmin C max  
    , 
1 1
n n
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= − + 
 
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and
1 1 1 1
( ) 1
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cw w wC i i C Cr r
max Ci i i Ci i iw cw
i i i iC C
T h DT TK K
D h D D
T T
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= = = =
   
= + + + − − +   
  
    , 
the quantity discount contract ( , )cw cwC CT
 
 
can be accepted by the supplier and the 
retailers to coordinate the FPSC, and the optimal profit allocation of the retailers, 
( , )cw cwi C Cx T
  ,
 
can be realized. 
From Proposition 3, we find that the solution to this programming problem can 
improve the profit of both the supplier and the retailers. Furthermore, if supply chain 
optimization is achieved, then the quantity discount contract guarantees a win-win 
result for the supplier and the retailers. Additionally, when the profit of the coalition 
is rationally allocated to each retailer such that the profit of each party under the 
current policy is greater than that under independent procurement, the members will 
stay. This occurs when the price that the supplier charges the retailer is in the range 
of [ , ]cw cwmin max 
  . 
Corollary 1. For joint procurement, when cwC
  is in the range of [ , ]cw cwmin max 
  , the 
profits of both the supplier and each retailer decrease with an increase in the 
deterioration rate. The ordering cycle is also shortened with an increase in the 
deterioration rate. 
Corollary 1 shows that if [ , ]cw cw cwC min max  
   , then the profits of both the supplier 
and each retailer decrease with an increase in the deterioration rate. Additionally, 




CT  decreases when   increases; this is in line with the actual management status. 
In fact, retailers need to shorten the ordering cycle when fresh produce products are 
at the end of their shelf life. That is, it is necessary to adjust the ordering cycle when 
the deterioration rate of fresh produce decreases sharply. Simultaneously, if the 
supplier and the retailer expect to gain more profit, then they can invest in efforts to 
maintain the freshness of products and to slow the deterioration rate. 
6. Coordination of the FPSC under joint procurement with 
coordination cost 
According to Balcik et al. (2010), coordination initiatives bear some costs, such as 
time and money costs. Consequently, the coordination cost may significantly affect 
the profits associated with joint procurement. Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss 
how to maximize the profit of the FPSC, that is, to discuss FPSC coordination issues 
when considering the coordination cost. For M N  , let ( )c N  denote the 
coordination cost; it satisfies the condition as follows: (1) ( ) 0c  = ; (2) for any given 
M N , ( ) ( )c M c N , and ( )c N  increases as the size of the coalition grows. In 
particular, we assume that the coordination cost faced by the supply chain players is 
a linear function of coalition size. The coordination cost for the coalition is given as 
( )c M km b= + , where m  represents the number of retailers who join the coalition, 
k  represents the coefficient of coalition size to the coordination cost and b  
represents a constant. Let superscript ew  and subscript C  denote the case with 
the quantity discount contract under joint procurement when considering the 
coordination cost. Therefore, the profit of the coalition of retailers per unit of time is 






C CT Tewn n n
ew ew ew ewCr
Cr C C i i i i C iew ew ew
i i iC C C
e TK kn b e




 = = =
− −+ + −
= − − −   .  (25) 
Applying the same concept as in Eq. (5), Eq. (25) can be simplified as follows:  
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For any given 0 , taking the first derivative of Eq. (26) with respect to ordering 
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− + = . Taking the second derivative of 
Eq. (26) with respect to ewCT , we get 
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2 3
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−  ; hence, 
( , )ew ew ewCr C CT   is concave to 
ew
CT . Therefore, we find that the optimal ordering cycle 





















into Eq. (26), we obtain the optimal profit of the coalition of 
retailers in the centralized FPSC as follows: 
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 .           (29) 
When the supplier and the retailers sign the quantity discount contract, the 
optimization problem of FPSC coordination can be formulated as follows:  
1
( , ) ( )
n
ew ew ew ew s
Cs C C C i ew
i C
K





               
(30) 
. . ( , ) ( , )ew ew ew w w wCr C C Cr C Cs t T T    .
                  
(31) 
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Solving the constraint condition, we have the selling price that the supplier 
charges the retailer as follows: 
1 1 1 1
( ) 1
2 2 2
ew ew ewn n n n
ew w wC i i C Cr r
C C i i C i iew ew
i i i iC C
T h DT TK kn b K kn b
D h D D
T T

   


= = = =
   + + + +
= + + + − − +   
  
    . (32) 
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 . (33) 
Taking the first derivative of Eq. (33) with respect to ordering cycle ewCT , we 
obtain the following: 
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   . 
Taking the second derivative of Eq. (33) with respect to ordering cycle 
ew
CT , we 
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(35) 



























= , we obtain the optimal ordering cycle:  
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2 2( ) ( ) 4 ( )
=
2
s r s r s rew
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+ + + + + + + + + + +
. 
The optimal ordering cycle shows the target point for the operational plan of an 
FPSC after the coordination cost is considered. 
Proposition 4. For the joint procurement case with the coordination cost, when the 

















, where ew ew ewmin C max  
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= = = =
   + + + +
= + + + − − +   
  
    , 
the coordination of an FPSC can be achieved by the quantity discount contract 
( , )ew ewC CT
   and the optimal profit allocation of the retailer ( , )ew ewi C Cx T
  . 
Proposition 4 has several managerial implications that strengthen the 
importance of joint procurement properties in determining the supplier’s optimal 
selling price and the ordering cycle. When the retailers join together and form the 
coalition, Proposition 4 provides the supplier with a simple rule, via the concept of 
cooperation, to determine the supplier’s selling price under different ordering cycles. 
Even when the ordering cycle is longer than the optimal ordering cycle, the value 
range of the supplier’s optimal selling price is a critical principle. In this situation, the 





to maximize the supplier’s own profit and to ensure the profit of the retailer coalition 
as well. Together, these results provide significant insights into the joint procurement 
problem of FPSCs under a quantity discount contract. 
Interestingly, the greater the number of retailers in the coalition is, the higher the 
coordination cost and the lower the profit for each retailer. Determining the optimal 
size of the coalition is important for the FPSC, as this choice affects the profit not only 
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for individual retailers but also for the whole coalition. 























, the profit of each retailer is not less than that in 
the case without a contract under joint procurement. In other words, when m  is 
beyond this range, the profit will decrease. 
Proposition 5 indicates that when the size of coalition M  reaches a certain 
range, joint procurement among retailers makes sense, as the profit will be higher. 
However, if the number of retailers in the coalition is too large, then the profit of 
each retailer will decrease due to the higher coordination cost. In other words, in a 
coalition that is too large, negotiating is troublesome and increases the cost. This 
means that one retailer can work with others, but if all retailers form a coalition, then 
the coordination cost will be too high. 
We now discuss how the quantity discount contract can be implemented in 
practice. The supplier and the coalition of retailers first agree on a quantity discount 
contract ( , )
ew ew
C CT . The supplier can observe the retail price and the demand rate 
determined by the retailers. Regarding Q , the supplier can conduct a check of the 
ordering quantity when the contract is reached. The ordering cycle of the retailers 

















. According to the contract, the 
selling price that the supplier charges the retailers is in the range of ,ew ewmin max 
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From the above discussion, we derive some instructions from the model. In 
practice, it is necessary to encourage retailers to form a grand coalition through 
negotiation and to adopt a joint procurement strategy. In addition, if the 
coordination cost is too high, then they can outsource joint procurement to a 
third-party logistics service supplier to minimize the operational cost. 
7. Numerical examples 
In this section, we present some numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical 
outcomes obtained in the previous sections. The supply of durians from Malaysia, 
one of the countries along the BRI, is presented as an example. Several supermarkets 
in China purchase durians from the fruit supplier in Malaysia. We are particularly 
interested in the effects of different policies and related parameters on the 
performance of each party. The numerical comparisons will illustrate the gaps 
between independent procurement and joint procurement in terms of each party’s 
expected profit, depending on the system parameters. 
7.1. Numerical analysis 
Here, we assume that the FPSC consists of one supplier and four retailers. For 
better illustration, instead of using dummy numbers, the FPSC in question is 
modified from a dataset containing four supermarket data sets. We set the 
deterioration rate as 0.02 = , the supplier’s fixed ordering cost as sK =¥100 (CNY) 
per order, the retailer’s fixed ordering cost as rK = ¥60 per order and the supplier’s 
procurement (or production) cost as c = ¥1.5 per unit. The different parameters of 
retailer i  are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2  Parameters of retailer i  
Retailer i  1 2 3 4 
iD  100 150 120 125 
ih  (CNY) 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.9 
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ip  (CNY) 5.0 4.8 4.5 5.2 
Using the parameters in Table 2, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycle impact the profits of both the supplier and the retailers. 





Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
2.8 288.91  118.65  199.96  99.66  180.25  
2.7594  548.89  121.97  205.50  103.35  180.25  
2.6656  502.46  131.47  219.76  114.76  192.13  
2.5743  457.26  140.73  233.64  125.86  203.70  
2.4968  418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
2.3619  352.12  162.25  265.93  151.70  230.60  
2.2342  288.91  175.19  285.34  167.22  246.78  
The results in Table 3, showing the profit of the supplier and retailers i  under 
independent procurement, verify Proposition 1. Table 3 also indicates that the value 
of the supplier’s profit is at a maximum when the selling price that the supplier 
charges the retailers is 2.7594
cw
max = , whereas the maximum value of the retailers’ 
profit occurs when the selling price that the supplier charges is 2.2342
cw
min = . When 
2.8cwDi = , it represents the situation that the supplier and the retailers don’t achieve the 
supply chain coordination. In this case, the retailers are unwilling to corporate with the 
supplier, the supplier’s profit is lower because of the higher selling price and less 
ordering quantity. While the supplier and the retailers can earn more profit than in the 
case without a contract, where 2.8
cw
Di = , when the supplier’s optimal selling price 
satisfies 
cw cw cw
min Di max  
    . In summary, an FPSC with a quantity discount contract 
is more optimized than an FPSC without a contract. 
The results in Table 4 verify Proposition 3. 
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Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
2.8 465.73 177.19 261.12 159.38 239.45 
2.7468 508.71 177.19 261.12 159.38 239.45 
2.7306 500.67 178.82 263.57 161.34 241.49 
2.7143 492.61 180.46 266.03 163.31 243.54 
2.7034 487.21 181.56 267.68 164.63 244.90 
2.6817 476.47 183.74 270.96 167.24 247.63 
2.6600 465.73 185.92 274.23 169.86 250.35 
The results show the profit of the supplier and retailers i  under joint 
procurement. Table 4 indicates that the retailers can earn more profit using joint 
procurement than they can with independent procurement. Moreover, the profit of 
the supplier under joint procurement is increased compared to the supplier’s profit 
under independent procurement. The threshold of the supplier’s selling price is 
smaller after the retailers engage in joint procurement (Table 4 vs. Table 3). 
Table 5 shows that the supplier’s selling price decreases with an increase in the 
deterioration rate, the ordering cycle of the retailer gradually becomes shorter, and 
the ordering frequency increases. 
Table 5  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycle with different 
deterioration rates 
  

















0.01 2.5019  1.3658  2.7055  0.9376  
0.02 2.4968  1.3420  2.7034  0.9219  
0.03 2.4917  1.3195  2.7014  0.9070  
0.04 2.4867  1.2981  2.6408  0.6230  
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Comparing independent procurement with joint procurement shows that under 
joint procurement, the supplier’s selling price is higher and the retailer’s ordering 
cycle is shorter. 
Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that the profits of both the supplier and the retailers 
decline as the deterioration rate increases, regardless of whether they are using 
independent procurement or joint procurement. 




Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
0.01 422.72  149.54  247.00  136.43  214.37  
0.02 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
0.03 415.10  147.65  243.89  134.19  212.68  
0.04 411.38  146.73  242.41  133.11  211.85  
 




Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
0.01 490.06  182.02  268.84  165.31  245.36  
0.02 487.21  181.56  267.68  164.63  244.90  
0.03 484.44  181.09  266.54  163.95  244.44  
0.04 404.17  167.16  237.40  145.03  229.31  
However, comparing Table 6 and Table 7 clearly shows that the supplier and the 
retailers can obtain more profit under joint procurement than under independent 
procurement. 
The numerical analysis indicates that coordinating FPSCs through quantity 
discount contracts makes sense regardless of how much the parameters change. 
Transportation Research Part E (2019) 
30 
 
When the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycle satisfy the contract, 
the profit of the supplier and the profit of the retailer are significantly higher than 
that without the contract. Table 5 shows that regardless of how much the parameters 
change, the closer ( , )cw cwC CT  is to ( , )
cw cw
C CT
  , the easier it is to coordinate the 
FPSC. In addition, the entire supply chain, the supplier and the retailers are all more 
profitable when the parameters are in the range of ( , )cw cwC CT
  . 
When the coordination cost is considered, the fixed ordering cost of coalition N  
is calculated, as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8  Parameters of the fixed ordering costs in coalition N 
N  {1} {2} {3} {4} {1,2} 
( )rK c N+  60 60 60 60 75.84 
N  {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} 
( )rK c N+  77.62 90.63 68.26 76.47 86.44 
N  {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 
( )rK c N+  93.54 94.80 109.54 99.86 112.62 





are listed in Table 9. 
Table 9  Parameters of the characteristic function values of ( )cwCr N

 
N  {1} {2} {3} {4} {1,2} 
( )cwCr N

 0.819 0.795 0.840 0.971 1.015 
N  {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} 
( )cwCr N

 1.031 1.034 1.084 1.112 1.070 
N  {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 
( )cwCr N

 1.135 1.192 1.127 1.171 1.254 
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Taking the parameters in Tables 8 and 9, we apply them to the previously 
analyzed scenarios. Now, we can obtain the profits of the supplier and the retailers 
under joint procurement considering the coordination cost. 
The effect of the coordination cost on the FPSC under joint procurement is 
shown in Table 10. 






Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
2.8 489.09 155.76 239.53 136.49 209.74 
2.8378 565.83 155.76 239.53 136.49 209.74 
2.7794 531.96 164.55 243.01 144.44 223.41 
2.7489 506.96 169.61 250.60 150.51 229.73 
2.7213 489.09 178.40 263.29 162.66 249.97 
Clearly, the profit is higher under independent procurement and lower when 
coordination is not considered. These results occurred because the ordering cycle 
increases and the ordering frequency decreases when the coordination cost is 
considered. Furthermore, according to Proposition 4, the optimal selling price that 
the supplier charges changes because it is also related to the coordination cost and 
the retailers’ ordering cycle. This relationship exemplifies the managerial complexity 
of an FPSC that consists of one supplier and multiple retailers. Table 10 illustrates 
that the total profit of an FPSC under a quantity discount contract is higher than that 
without a contract. This result implies the efficiency and significance of quantity 
discount contracts in coordinating an FPSC under joint procurement. 
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7.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection, a sensitivity analysis of demand and the deterioration rate is 
performed based on the above example; the results are shown in Table 11 and Table 
12. We carried out the sensitivity analysis in terms of different levels of demand and 
different deterioration rates. Table 11 shows the sensitivity of the parameters to the 
selling price for the retailer, the ordering cycle and the expected total cost per unit 
under independent procurement and joint procurement. Here,   is the supplier’s 
selling price to retailer, T  is the retailer’s ordering cycle, and   is the fresh 
product’s deterioration rate. 
Table 11  Sensitivity analysis of demand and the deterioration rate under independent 
procurement 
Parameters Changes (in %) i  iT  i  
D  
20 +0.0027 +0.1180 0.1704 
10 +0.0024 +0.0541 0.0855 
+10 0.0029 0.0465 +0.0859 
+20 0.0059 0.0871 +0.1720 
  
20 +0.1102 +0.1975 +0.2682 
10 +0.0512 +0.0864 +0.1374 
+10 0.0394 0.0741 0.1407 
+20 0.0787 0.1235 0.2842 
Table 12 shows the sensitivity of the parameters to the selling price for the 
retailer, the ordering cycle and the expected total cost per unit under joint 
procurement. 
Table 12  Sensitivity analysis of demand and the deterioration rate under joint procurement 
Parameters Changes (in %) i  iT  i  
D  
20 +0.0016 +0.1014 0.2000 
10 +0.0010 +0.0471 0.1000 
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+10 0.0027 0.0333 +0.1806 
+20 0.0035 0.0675 +0.2336 
  
20 +0.0258 +0.2209 +0.4689 
10 +0.0148 +0.0930 +0.2345 
+10 0.0148 0.0814 0.2345 
+20 0.0332 0.1395 0.4689 
Compared with the deterioration rate, demand plays a minor significant role, 
but as we expected, the selling price for the retailer and the ordering cycle are 
decreased when the level of demand is increased. That is, the total profit is increased 
by increasing demand. 
The supplier’s selling price for the retailer and the ordering cycle are highly 
dependent on the deterioration rate. That is, the total profit is decreased if the 
deterioration rate is raised. 
8. Extension 
It is known that demand for a product is not always certain. When it is stochastic, 
will the structure of the optimal policy obtained in the deterministic case change for 
the stochastic case? Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the joint procurement policy 
when the demand is stochastic. Consequently, we have accounted for stochastic 
demand in developing the model. In this section, we set consumers’ demands to 
follow a normal distribution considering that these uncertainties make the problem 
more similar to real-life supply and demand issues. Here, we assume the demand 
follows the normal distribution, D ~ 2( , )  . Therefore, the density function of the 
normal distribution is given by 





xf x e  

− −= . Let superscript e and 
subscript C denote the case with a quantity discount under joint procurement. 
Therefore, the objective function and constraint of this model are given as follows: 
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Solving the constraint condition, we have the selling price that the supplier 
charges the retailer as follows: 
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Substituting eC  into ( , )
e e e
Cs C CT  , we obtain the optimal profit of the supplier 
as follows: 
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Taking the first derivative of Eq. (39) with respect to ordering cycle eCT , we 
obtain the following equation: 
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= , we obtain the following ordering cycle:  
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Due to the analytical solutions being difficult to analyze, we make the 
simulation with random demand. The demand follows the normal distribution 
D ~ 2( , )  . Here, we choose five cases D ~ (100,15)，D ~ (100,25) ，D ~ (100,45) ，
D ~ (120,25) , and D ~ (140,25)  as the examples (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) to 
illustrate. 
 
Figure 2  Normal distribution of demand with different variance 
 
 
Figure 3  Normal distribution of demand with different mean 
 
We assume the FPSC consists of one supplier and four retailers. To better 
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illustrate, instead of using dummy numbers, we study a FPSC modified from the 
dataset of four supermarkets. We set the deterioration rate as 0.02 = , the 
supplier’s fixed ordering cost as sK = ¥100 (CNY) 
per order, the retailer’s fixed 
ordering cost as 
rK = ¥60 per order, and the supplier’s procurement (or production) 
cost as c = ¥1.5 per unit. The different parameters of retailer i  are summarized in 
Table 13. 
Table 13  Parameters of retailer i  
Retailer i  1 2 3 4 
ih  (CNY) 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.9 
ip  (CNY) 5.0 4.8 4.5 5.2 
(1) Case 1: The demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,15) . 
Using the parameters in Table 13, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycles affect the profits of both the supplier and the retailers when the 
demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,15) . 
Table 14  Profits of the supplier and the retailers under independent procurement 
Demand 
Profit (CNY) 
Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
40 272.94  71.79  167.16  74.48  126.98  
60 309.17  90.42  186.55  89.29  148.21  
80 345.59  109.47  206.06  104.40  169.74  
90 382.17  128.88  225.69  119.74  191.52  
100 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
110 455.76  168.54  265.25  151.02  235.71  
120 492.73  188.72  285.17  166.92  258.08  
140 529.80  209.10  305.17  182.96  280.61  
160 566.96  229.66  325.25  199.14  303.28  
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The results in Table 14 show that the profits of the supplier and retailers increase 
as demand increases when the demand follows normal distribution D ~ (100,15) . 
The changing trend is similar with the case where the demand is deterministic. 
Table 15  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycles with different 
deterioration rates 
  

















0.01 2.4747  1.4947  2.6969  1.0261  
0.02 2.4691  1.4687  2.6947  1.0091  
0.03 2.4635  1.4441  2.6924  0.9929  
0.04 2.4581  1.4208  2.6902  0.9775  
When comparing independent procurement with joint procurement, it can be 
noted that under joint procurement the supplier’s selling price is higher and the 
retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter. 
(2) Case 2: The demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,25) . 
Using the parameters in Table 13, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycles affect the profits of both the supplier and the retailers when the 
demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,25) . 
Table 16  Profits of the supplier and the retailers under independent procurement 
Demand 
Profit (CNY) 
Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
60 309.17  90.42  186.55  89.29  148.21  
70 327.35  99.90  196.29  96.81  158.94  
80 345.59  109.47  206.06  104.40  169.74  
90 382.17  128.88  225.69  119.74  191.52  
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100 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
110 455.76  168.54  265.25  151.02  235.71  
120 492.73  188.72  285.17  166.92  258.08  
130 511.25  198.89  295.16  174.93  269.32  
140 529.80  209.10  305.17  182.96  280.61  
The results in Table 16 indicate that the profits of the supplier and retailers 
increase as demand increases when the demand follows the normal distribution 
D ~ (100,25) . The changing trend is similar with the case where the demand is 
deterministic. 
Table 17  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycles with different 
deterioration rates 
  

















0.01 2.4892  1.4259  2.7015  0.9789  
0.02 2.4839  1.4011  2.6993  0.9625  
0.03 2.4785  1.3776  2.6972  0.9471  
0.04 2.4733  1.3553  2.6951  0.9324  
When comparing independent procurement with joint procurement, it can be 
noted that under joint procurement the supplier’s selling price is higher and the 
retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter. 
(3) Case 3: The demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,40) . 
Using the parameters in Table 13, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycles affect the profits of both the supplier and the retailers when the 
demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (100,40) . 
Table 18  Profits of the supplier and the retailers under independent procurement 





Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
80 345.59  109.47  206.06  104.40  169.74  
85 363.86  119.13  215.86  112.04  180.60  
90 382.17  128.88  225.69  119.74  191.52  
95 400.52  138.69  235.54  127.49  202.49  
100 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
105 437.31  158.53  255.32  143.14  224.59  
110 455.76  168.54  265.25  151.02  235.71  
115 474.23  178.60  275.20  158.95  246.87  
120 492.73  188.72  285.17  166.92  258.08  
The results in Table 18 indicate that the profits of the supplier and retailers 
increase as demand increases when the demand follows the normal distribution 
D ~ (100,40) . The changing trend is similar with the case where the demand is 
deterministic. 
Table 19  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycles with different 
deterioration rates 
  

















0.01 2.5019  1.3658  2.7055  0.9376  
0.02 2.4968  1.3420  2.7034  0.9219  
0.03 2.4917  1.3195  2.7014  0.9070  
0.04 2.4867  1.2981  2.6408  0.6230  
When comparing independent procurement with joint procurement, it can be 
noted that under joint procurement the supplier’s selling price is higher and the 
retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter. 
(4) Case 4: The demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (120,25) . 
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Using the parameters in Table 13, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycles affect the profits of both the supplier and the retailers when the 
demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (120,25) . 
Table 20  Profits of the supplier and the retailers under independent procurement 
Demand 
Profit (CNY) 
Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
80 345.59  109.47  206.06  104.40  169.74  
90 382.17  128.88  225.69  119.74  191.52  
100 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
110 455.76  168.54  265.25  151.02  235.71  
120 492.73  188.72  285.17  166.92  258.08  
130 511.25  198.89  295.16  174.93  269.32  
140 529.80  209.10  305.17  182.96  280.61  
150 548.37  219.36  315.20  191.04  291.92  
160 566.96  229.66  325.25  199.14  303.28  
The results in Table 20 indicate that the profits of the supplier and retailers 
increase as demand increases when the demand follows the normal distribution 
D ~ (120,25) . The changing trend is similar with the case where the demand is 
deterministic. 
Table 21  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycles with different 
deterioration rates 
  

















0.01 2.5133  1.3127  2.7090  0.9011  
0.02 2.5083  1.2898  2.7071  0.8860  
0.03 2.5034  1.2682  2.7051  0.8717  
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0.04 2.4986  1.2476  2.7032  0.8581  
When comparing independent procurement with joint procurement, it can be 
noted that under joint procurement the supplier’s selling price is higher and the 
retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter. 
(5) Case 5: The demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (140,25) . 
Using the parameters in Table 13, we apply them to the previously analyzed 
scenarios. Next, we analyze how the supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ 
ordering cycles affect the profits of both the supplier and the retailers when the 
demand follows the normal distribution D ~ (140,25) . 
Table 22  Profits of the supplier and the retailers under independent procurement 
Demand 
Profit (CNY) 
Supplier Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
100 418.90  148.58  245.42  135.29  213.51  
110 455.76  168.54  265.25  151.02  235.71  
120 492.73  188.72  285.17  166.92  258.08  
130 511.25  198.89  295.16  174.93  269.32  
140 529.80  209.10  305.17  182.96  280.61  
150 548.37  219.36  315.20  191.04  291.92  
160 566.96  229.66  325.25  199.14  303.28  
170 585.57  239.99  335.32  207.27  314.66  
180 604.20  250.37  345.41  215.43  326.07  
The results in Table 22 indicate that the profits of supplier and retailers increase 
as demand increases when the demand follows the normal distribution 
D ~ (140,25) . The changing trend is similar with the case where the demand is 
deterministic. 
Table 23  The supplier’s selling price and the retailers’ ordering cycles with different 






















0.01 2.5234  1.2653  2.7122  0.8686  
0.02 2.5186  1.2433  2.7103  0.8540  
0.03 2.5139  1.2224  2.7085  0.8401  
0.04 2.5092  1.2025  2.7066  0.8270  
When comparing independent procurement with joint procurement, it can be 
noted that under joint procurement the supplier’s selling price is higher and the 
retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter. 
From the above cases, we can see that the profits of the supplier and the retailers 
are positively related to the demands of the fresh produce. The supplier’s selling 
price under joint procurement is higher and the retailer’s ordering cycle is shorter 
when comparing with the case of independent procurement. All the trends under the 
stochastic demand are similar to the deterministic case. 
9. Conclusions 
The BRI is a major international economic strategy and is an economic 
framework developed to increase the connectivity between China and the BRI 
partner countries. This initiative brings many opportunities for FPSC industries. In 
this paper, we examined an FPSC consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers in 
countries along the BRI. We are particularly interested in FPSC coordination through 
a quantity discount contract when the deterioration rate is considered. Two cases are 
considered in this study: independent procurement and joint procurement. In each 
case, we determine the optimal selling price for the supplier and the optimal 
ordering cycle. In addition, the optimal profit allocation for each retailer is assessed. 
The results suggest that quantity discount contracts guarantee a win-win result 
between the supplier and the retailers; that is, the profit of each party under joint 
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procurement is greater than that in the case of independent procurement, as 
explained by the following points: 
• In negotiating the contract, when the change in the supplier’s selling price is 
within a certain range, the supplier and the retailers can gain more profit than 
in the case without a contract. 
• If the profit allocation satisfies the effectiveness conditions, then the retailers 
will have enough motivation to form a grand coalition. Notably, the profit of 
each retailer can be ensured when the number of retailers in the coalition is 
within a certain range. 
• The total profit of the FPSC is negatively correlated with the deterioration 
rate of products; therefore, to reduce loss in the supply chain, the optimal 
ordering cycle must be carefully considered. 
From a theoretical perspective, this research is one of only a few papers to study 
an FPSC consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers and to account for both the 
deterioration rate and the supply chain coordination cost simultaneously. 
Furthermore, many studies examine supply chain coordination strategies without 
considering the impact of coalition size on the coordination cost. However, in our 
paper, we derive analytic results for a coalition size that guarantees a higher profit 
for both the retailers and the supplier and for how to rationally allocate the profit 
among them, enriching our understanding of FPSC operations and management. 
From a practical perspective, when two or more retailers procure one kind of 
product from one supplier and they can use joint procurement and a quantity 
discount contract, it is necessary to encourage retailers to form a grand coalition 
through negotiation. If the supplier’s selling price is within the range where both the 
supplier and the retailers gain more profit than under independent procurement, 
then all parties can agree on a quantity discount contract. In addition, if the 
coordination cost is higher than the increased profit, then joint procurement could be 
outsourced to a third-party logistics company to minimize the operational cost. 
There are several directions that warrant further research. In this paper, we 
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assume that a product shortage is not allowed. A natural extension is to examine a 
setting in which the supply and demand are not equal. As the level of demand in this 
research is assumed to be constant, another avenue of research would be to examine 
a situation in which demand is stochastic. Finally, we will extend our model to 
consider how an FPSC may be coordinated through a quantity discount contract in 
an incomplete information environment. 
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Appendix A. 
A.1. The proof of Proposition 1 
For any given cwDiT , taking the first derivative of ( , )
cw cw cw
Dri Di DiT  with respect to 
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= − − 
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Thus, the existence of [ , ]cw cwmin max 
   is verified. The proof of Proposition 1 is 
completed. 
A.2. The proof of Lemma 1 
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Therefore, ( )( ), wCrN M  is a concave game. 
A.3. The proof of Proposition 2 
We know that 
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; that is, 
( , ) ( , )w w w w w wCs Ci C Ds Di DT T   
  . Clearly, joint procurement can improve the supplier’s 
profit. 
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A.4. The proof of Proposition 3 
In this situation, the profits of retailers are given as follows: 
1 1
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For any given cwCT , taking the first derivative of ( , )
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For any feasible quantity discount contract ( , )cw cwC CT
  , it is necessary for the 
coalition to reasonably assign a portion of the total profit to each retailer under joint 
procurement. Consequently, all retailers will have an incentive to stay in the grand 
coalition. In general, the optimal ordering cycle cwCT
  is equal to ( )w cwC CT 
   when 
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the optimal ordering cycle: 
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Thus, the proof of Proposition 3 is complete. 
A.5. The proof of Corollary 1 
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is negatively correlated with the deterioration rate. However, cwC
  must be in the 
range of [ , ]cw cwmin max 
  . Thus, we obtain Corollary 1. 
A.6. The proof of Proposition 4 
When the coordination cost is considered, the profit of fresh produce retailers is 
given as follows: 
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is a decreasing function of ewC . 
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When 
1
( , ) ( )
n
ew ew ew w s





   

=
 − − , that is, when the supplier can earn 




ew ew w s s









 − + 
 
  . 
To make profit allocation ( , )ew ewi C Cx T
   satisfy effectiveness, note that 
1
( , ) ( )
m
ew ew ew
i C C Cr
i
x T M  
=


















Then, we can calculate the optimal profit allocation of the coalition of retailers as 






( ) ( ) ( )
( )
ew ew ew r





x p D h D
h D





= − − +
+
. 
Thus, the proof of Proposition 4 is complete. 
A.7. The proof of Proposition 5 
For i N  , note that 
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Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (A4), we obtain the following: 
1
2( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
w w w r





x p D h D
h D





= − − +
+
 
Let wi Drix 
  ; that is, the profit of each retailer is not less than that in the case 
without the quantity discount contract under joint procurement. Therefore, 
1
2( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
( )
w w w wr





p D h D p D K h D
h D




− − +  − − +
+
. Then, 























Therefore, Proposition 5 is proven. 
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